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Key Points
·  The last decade has seen a surge of interest in 
public-philanthropic partnerships (PPPs), due 
not only to these collaborations’ notable suc-
cesses but also to the 2008 election of Barack 
Obama. The Obama administration unveiled 
a series of initiatives that looked to philan-
thropy to help identify innovative programs. 
·  To explore the issues involved in PPPs, this article 
looks at two key federal initiatives, Michigan’s 
Office of the Foundation Liaison, and the involve-
ment of foundations in state and local responses 
to the 2007 financial crisis and the implementa-
tion of the federal economic stimulus package.
· The growth of public-philanthropic partnerships 
will present foundations with significant chal-
lenges that will require a clearer understand-
ing – even a redefinition – of private and public 
responsibilities toward funding social programs.
Viewed early on as society’s venture capital, 
philanthropic foundations have been traditionally 
seen as pursuers of  social innovation. Presumably 
free from external constraints, foundations can 
explore issues and take risks that the market or 
government cannot. Historically, the relationship 
between foundations and government was one in 
which the former helped develop solutions to so-
cial problems and the latter, due to its greater size 
and resources, implemented those solutions. With 
this relatively clear division of  labor, the relation-
ship was typically not one of  close collaboration 
or partnership. 
The last decade, however, has witnessed a surge 
of  interest in public-philanthropic partnerships 
(PPPs); a 2010 survey by GrantCraft generated 
responses from more than 1,500 individuals 
who reported experiences with foundation-
government collaborations. This focus on PPPs 
is partially due to the scores of  such collabora-
tions in cities and states across the nation coming 
to programmatic fruition, with their successes 
drawing attention from the broader grantmaking 
community (GrantCraft, 2010; Ferris & Williams, 
2013; Person, Strong, Ferguson, & Berk, 2009). 
But the interest can also be traced to the excite-
ment within the foundation community over the 
2008 election of  Barack Obama, who served as a 
board member of  the Joyce Foundation in Chi-
cago. Many foundation leaders believed that they 
would soon be dealing with a sympathetic White 
House, appreciative of  their contributions and 
eager to work as allies. Indeed, shortly after taking 
office Obama invited a number of  foundation of-
ficials to Washington to discuss with his transition 
team the possibilities for collaboration. This was, 
according to veteran foundation watchers, “an 
unprecedented strategic outreach” (Foster, 2009, 
p. 36).
Once in office, Obama unveiled a series of  initia-
tives – including the Social Innovation Fund, 
the Department of  Education’s Race to the Top 
program and its Investing in Innovation (i3) 
Fund, the Promise and Choice Neighborhood 
initiatives, and “Pay for Success” bonds – that 
looked to philanthropy to help identify innovative 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1201
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programs and bring them to scale. As one founda-
tion observer said, “The Obama administration 
is committed to leveraging the capital and the 
intelligence of  a distinctive swath of  foundations 
dedicated to identifying and promoting social 
entrepreneurs” (R. Cohen, 2010).  The attention 
the administration lavished on a select number of  
foundations sustained the enthusiasm of  many 
within the grantmaking community for the PPPs 
they themselves had fostered, and encouraged 
grantmakers to think more generally and critically 
about public-philanthropic partnerships. 
But beneath the waves of  excitement generated 
when the administration announced its various 
initiatives were undercurrents of  apprehension. 
Some wondered about the exact nature of  the 
role of  foundations in the partnerships the White 
House was promoting and cautioned that the 
administration seemed to be privileging a certain 
kind of  collaboration, as well as certain founda-
tions, over others. Others expressed concerns 
about threats to sector independence or raised 
questions about transparency and accountability. 
These high-profile debates have amplified the 
more general apprehensions among foundations 
about entering into partnerships – those center-
ing on difficulties in reconciling divergent cultures 
and expectations of  partners in any jurisdiction 
(R. Cohen, 2010).
The last decade was not only a period of  policy 
innovation, of  course; it was also a time of  severe 
economic distress. The recession heightened the 
urgency felt by governments on the local, state, 
and federal levels to marshal all available resources 
and led some officials to seek a form of  public-
philanthropic partnership in which foundations 
supplement shrinking government budgets. But 
economic necessity also encouraged more inven-
tive means of  collaboration. The dire economic 
climate both alarmed foundation leaders and em-
boldened their efforts to work with government, 
and at the same time magnified attitudes toward 
both the promise and perils of  partnership.
This enthusiasm and apprehension is reflected 
in the small but growing body of  literature on 
PPPs, which includes journalistic investigations, 
academic studies, and nonprofit surveys. The 
discussion is still marked by a sense of  novelty and 
a belief  in the great potential these partnerships 
offer. But it is characterized as well by an appraisal 
of  the costs, dangers, and difficulties. The division 
of  labor and the costs and benefits for both sides 
are still not fully clear. In trying to define the 
boundaries of  institutional partnerships generally 
and PPPs in particular, the literature has begun to 
illuminate a continuum of  collaboration” (Austin, 
2000). In terms of  PPPs, alignment between 
foundation and government goals and strategies 
intensifies as they move across the continuum, 
and those strategies are increasingly implemented 
in concert. Resources are also increasingly aligned 
and pooled. At one end are unstructured en-
gagements with little coordination; at the other, 
formalized partnerships characterized by joint 
decision-making. Along this continuum, it is dif-
ficult to determine when a partnership coalesces 
from the mass of  informal interactions. At the 
very least, some degree of  communication and 
coordination is necessary (Person et al., 2009). 
The functions that foundations perform in PPPs 
can take multiple forms. In particular, they can: 
•	 develop and invest in pilot programs in collabo-
ration with government; 
•	 jointly fund established programs with govern-
ment;  
The discussion is still marked 
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•	 support capacity-building within government 
and government grantees; 
•	 convene government officials, experts, and vari-
ous stakeholders; 
•	 educate the public and the policy community; 
•	 fund research and policy analysis; and 
•	 evaluate policy implementation.
 
Each of  these functions carries with it particular 
benefits, costs, and risks, and each can fall within 
a range of  positions on the collaboration con-
tinuum. 
To illustrate the issues involved in PPPs, we look 
at two key federal initiatives, the Social Invest-
ment Fund and the Department of  Education’s 
Investing in Innovation Fund; the state-level 
experience of  Michigan’s Office of  the Founda-
tion Liaison; and the involvement of  foundations 
in state and local responses to the 2007 financial 
crisis and the implementation of  the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
The history of  philanthropy is replete with 
foundation-initiated innovations and demon-
strations that led to new government programs 
and projects and therefore come under the PPP 
umbrella. We focus here on emerging PPP themes 
that involve government more proactively or cast 
foundations in new and less familiar roles.  
Social Innovation Fund
The Social Innovation Fund (SIF) was perhaps the 
most heralded of  the Obama administration’s ini-
tiatives and the one most closely associated with 
a new entrepreneurial approach that promotes 
cross-sector partnerships. The SIF was established 
in April 2009 under the Edward M. Kennedy Serve 
America Act and was housed in the Corporation 
for National and Community Service. The White 
House announced that through SIF it would 
award $50 million, in allotments of  $5 million to 
$10 million each, to a handful of  intermediary 
grantmakers who would award annual grants of  
at least $100,000 to service providers for projects 
to improve “measurable outcomes” in economic 
opportunity, public health, or youth development. 
Both the intermediary grantmakers and the non-
profits they supported were required to provide 
1:1 matching funds, raising the total leveraged by 
social-innovation funding to around $200 million 
for the 2010 fiscal year (Perry, 2010).
The SIF represented a particular model of  public-
philanthropic partnerships, in which the primary 
aim of  the relationship would be the pursuit of  
leverage and scale. As Thomas Kalil (2011), White 
House deputy director of  policy, explained, the 
federal government would act as a “convener and 
catalyst,"  a role grantmakers commonly play in 
relationships with nonprofits. This was rather un-
settling for some foundation leaders. Accustomed 
to a degree of  deference from grantees, who are 
often forced to accept the opacity of  the founda-
tion decision-making process with little debate, 
grantmakers were now compelled to defer to the 
White House. As one grantmaker told GrantCraft 
(2010), “It can be a great humbling experience 
when the shoe is on the other foot.” Yet it also 
was instructive, sensitizing grantmakers to the 
challenges faced by nonprofits in dealing with the 
administrative requirements necessary to procure 
The SIF represented a 
particular model of  public-
philanthropic partnerships, 
in which the primary aim 
of  the relationship would be 
the pursuit of  leverage and 
scale. The federal government 
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Public-Philanthropic Partnerships
THE FoundationReview 2014 Vol 6:2 55
S
E
C
T
O
R
grants (Grantmakers for Effective Organizations, 
2011).
The SIF attracted considerable comment from the 
press and generated excitement from certain sec-
tors of  the foundation community – most notably 
in May 2010, when five foundations committed an 
additional $50 million to the fund. A number of  
foundations also contributed just over $4 million 
to the foundation affinity group Grantmakers 
for Effective Organizations (GEO) for the Scaling 
What Works project, to derive and promote the 
lessons of  the SIF. 
Several commentators argued that the money 
that the administration had committed to the 
fund was actually quite modest and that SIF’s real 
accomplishment was less in the funds it leveraged 
than in the debate it sparked over the nature of  in-
novation and the role of  philanthropy and govern-
ment in promoting it, as well as over the benefits 
and dangers in the pursuit of  “scale” (R. Cohen, 
2009, 2010). Others, however, focused on the 
sorts of  foundations and nonprofits that would 
be favored through the administration’s endorse-
ment of  the priorities of  social entrepreneurship 
and matching requirements. They also shed light 
on those that would likely be ignored, such as 
smaller, less-established nonprofits devoted to ad-
vocacy work and foundations that catered to rural 
populations (Eisenberg, 2010).
After several years of  operation, the extent to 
which the SIF is directing resources to innova-
tive programs or just channeling funding to 
established charities through its use of  regional 
intermediaries is still debated. There also has been 
some question regarding SIF’s success in reach-
ing out to the broader philanthropic community 
(Donovan, 2012).  In a survey of  foundation lead-
ers by the Center for Effective Philanthropy  (Bu-
teau and Buchanan, 2012), 38 percent of  the 173 
respondents reported not being familiar enough 
with SIF to judge whether it had “the potential to 
have an important positive influence on founda-
tion practice” (p. 6).
The criticisms of  SIF from both the political 
left and right often touched on the question of  
philanthropic independence, though the term was 
understood differently at each ideological pole (T. 
Cohen, 2009). As education analyst Chester Finn 
argued at an event sponsored by the Hudson In-
stitute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy & Civic 
Renewal, a close relationship between govern-
ment and foundations threatens to undermine 
some of  nonprofits’ primary advantages: their 
ability to remain autonomous and potentially 
oppositional to the public sector. “They have a 
unique capacity to do what government cannot or 
will not do,” he said. “That's a far different thing 
from serving as guide dog, tugboat, or aide-de-
camp to government itself ” (Finn, 2010, p. 18). A 
number of  nonprofit leaders and their progressive 
allies voiced fears that SIF would warp founda-
tion priorities toward those favored by the federal 
government and questioned whether the benefits 
of  partnerships at the highest level of  govern-
ment would trickle down to the grassroots level 
to sustain nonprofits. Another issue was whether 
such partnerships would develop the account-
ability, transparency, and inclusivity that nonprofit 
advocates claim are easier to cultivate at the local 
level (Tagle & Gwaltney, 2009).
As education analyst Chester 
Finn argued at an event 
sponsored by the Hudson 
Institute’s Bradley Center for 
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Conservatives, meanwhile, framed their concerns 
about sector independence in terms of  the politi-
cization of  philanthropy. The right’s leading critic 
of  SIF, Howard Husock, regarded the emergence 
of  the fund as evidence of  the “the Solyndra-iza-
tion of  philanthropy,” a reference to the Califor-
nia-based solar panel manufacturer that received 
a $500 million Department of  Energy grant and 
then went bankrupt, “in which the government 
would brand select social-service organizations 
with the Washington seal of  approval, and thus 
signal that private charitable capital should be 
directed to the same organizations” (2011). The 
analogy presumed that the White House would 
be as inept in picking winners among grant-
makers as it had been in the alternative-energy 
market, while insisting on channeling private 
funds toward its own idiosyncratic ideological 
priorities. Husock pointed out, for instance, that 
one of  the initial SIF grants, of  $2 million to the 
Missouri Foundation for Health, was targeted at 
reducing tobacco use and obesity, the latter being 
one of  the signature causes of  first lady Michelle 
Obama (Husock, 2010). After Republicans took 
control of  the House in 2010, another conserva-
tive commentator wondered whether the House 
might “retaliate” against foundations perceived to 
be advancing White House priorities and initiate 
congressional hearings (Schambra, 2011). That 
threat, whether idle or not, points to a signifi-
cant challenge facing foundation leaders: how to 
partner with a particular administration while 
avoiding the appearance of  co-optation.1
The conservative complaint regarding the politici-
zation of  philanthropy under the Obama admin-
istration is linked to a more general conservative 
suspicion of  public-philanthropy partnerships. If  
some progressives have expressed concern that 
PPPs represent an offloading of  the common 
good from the public to the private sector and 
potentially mask or excuse the inefficiencies of  
government (Schiller, 2013), conservatives have 
expressed the opposite reservation. Such partner-
ships, they fear, allow the government to inflate its 
capacities artificially and beyond what it can afford 
to do with its own democratically allotted re-
sources, while depleting the private philanthropic 
sector’s resources for its own independently con-
ceived aims (Finn, 2010). These concerns raise a 
question that the literature on PPPs must engage 
more fully: Are such collaborative arrangements 
inherently suspect within conservative ideology, 
or are such arguments merely the partisan griping 
of  an oppositional party? 
Investing in Innovation Fund 
The Obama administration raised similar ques-
tions with the pursuit of  PPPs in many of  its 
education initiatives. Education is a policy venue 
1 For one example of  a philanthropic leader struggling to es-
tablish some distance between his foundation and the Obama 
administration while also acknowledging the advantageous 
political climate, see Gara LaMarche’s comments in Bradley 
Center, 2010.
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where PPPs have established roots; foundations, 
especially those with close local or regional ties, 
long pursued school reform district by district. 
But in recent years more foundations have pushed 
for policy changes on the state or national level 
(Hess, 2005; Ravitch, 2010). The agenda of  these 
foundations was soon seen as closely aligned with 
the education policies of  the Obama administra-
tion and other prominent national officials. 
Arne Duncan, Obama’s secretary of  education, 
closely collaborated with foundations in Chicago 
when he was head of  that city’s public school 
system. Once at the helm of  the Department 
of  Education (ED), he recruited a number of  
foundation officials for his staff – his chief  of  staff, 
for example, came from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation – and created a position to serve as 
liaison to the foundation community. As the ED’s 
newsletter declared, “This dedicated role within 
the Secretary’s Office signals to the philanthropic 
world that the Department is ‘open for business’” 
(cited in Barkan, 2011).
Among the ED's more interesting partnership 
initiatives is what became known as the Invest-
ing in Innovation (i3) Fund, which focused on 
taking successful educational practices to scale. 
The administration set aside $650 million in funds 
from the economic stimulus package for i3. To be 
eligible for funding, grantees had to match 20 per-
cent of  their federal funding with private funds; 
an acknowledgement of  the import of  PPPs was 
thereby built into the program. In fact, the pro-
gram called on grantmakers to rally behind a set 
of  innovation priorities identified by ED. A report 
by Bellwether Education Partners concluded that 
even for the large national foundations involved, 
“explicitly aligning their work with federal govern-
ment priorities [was] relatively uncharted terri-
tory” (Smith & Petersen, 2011, p. 43).
And yet the possibility of  leveraging government 
funds, at a moment when many foundations had 
reduced their own education funding, was enough 
to persuade many to brave ahead – though they 
did push back against an initial idea that would 
have required them to pool matching funds, since 
it would have resulted in an even greater loss of  
individual discretion. As ED officials were plan-
ning the program, foundation leaders met with 
Duncan on several occasions to identify their own 
funding priorities and map out points of  overlap 
with the ED. In April 2009, before the i3 applica-
tions were due, 12 foundations announced they 
would commit an additional $500 million in 2010 
funds to the program. The W.K. Kellogg Founda-
tion provided technical support for rural appli-
cants; in the spring of  2010, a group of  foundation 
leaders led by the Gates Foundation created the 
Foundation Registry, a website that allowed ap-
plicants to post proposal summaries for potential 
funders to review and funders to share diligence 
on applicants (Smith & Petersen, 2011).
The i3 program exposed the strains that can arise 
in even the most successful partnerships. One of  
the prime challenges was coordinating the govern-
ment and foundation time frames. While usually 
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of  governmental bureaucracy, 
requirements in the American 
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with finalists given just weeks 
to present evidence of  a match.
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it is foundations that must deal with the plodding 
pace of  governmental bureaucracy, requirements 
in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of  2009 (ARRA) forced grantmakers to move 
swiftly, with finalists given just weeks to present 
evidence of  a match. Decisions were made in 
a month rather than in traditional grant cycles, 
requiring many foundations to innovate in their 
own grantmaking procedures, such as securing 
advance board approval. Some welcomed the ur-
gency of  the accelerated time frame; others found 
it unrealistic. 
There was also considerable tension over the 
nature of  the decision-making process. The ED 
initially required all applicants to show evidence 
of  a match commitment with their application, 
which drew complaints that its funders would be 
required to pick and choose among grantees and 
privilege applicants that already had relationships 
with large foundations. But when ED switched 
the requirement so that evidence of  a match was 
required only after the government’s peer review 
selection, some foundation leaders complained: 
“Letting the private partners only partner on 
funding of  already selected ideas does not seem 
like much of  a partnership,” commented one 
grantmaker (Smith & Petersen, 2011, p. 44). Oth-
ers were willing to credit the program’s effective-
ness in selecting – or “validating,” in i3’s lingo 
– grantees that had reached a certain critical mass, 
having already benefited from the support, flex-
ibility, and greater tolerance for risk of  the private 
sector, and then using government resources to 
potentially broaden the scale. But critics main-
tained that the program did not seem well suited 
to identify early-stage innovation and that it was 
a task better left to expert intermediaries, as in 
the SIF model. They argued that a better design 
would have tailored the nature of  the PPPs to the 
various relationships established between grantee 
and government (Smith & Petersen, 2011).
The overall reception among grantmakers to the 
program was mixed, an ambivalence that perhaps 
reflected the tensions within the program’s objec-
tives and between innovation and scale, as well 
as the constraints of  operating within federal 
guidelines. Some funders were disappointed 
that the eventual grantees did not produce what 
they considered significant innovation. But many 
others appreciated the program’s emphasis on 
evidence and believed it did bring new nonprofits 
to funders’ attention. As executives of  the Wil-
liam and Flora Hewlett Foundation noted, the 19 
nonprofits that received the highest scores in the 
i3 competition had on average received grants 
in 2010 from only three of  the top 50 education 
foundations before winning the i3. In the end, all 
49 finalists secured their match, though efforts to 
find funding for highly rated applicants that did 
not win grants proved less successful. Ultimately, 
the i3 program could claim credit for directing at 
least $140 million in private matching funds, $50 
million of  which came from foundations, to the 
highest rated applicants. But it is difficult to deter-
mine how much of  that $50 million represented 
new funding streams and how much would have 
been directed to education even in the program’s 
absence (Smith & Petersen, 2011).
Michigan’s Office of the Foundation 
Liaison
One of  the most significant innovations over the 
last decade in the development of  public-philan-
thropic partnerships has been the establishment 
of  intergovernmental offices or liaisons to identify 
and foster these relationships. In 2003, Democratic 
Gov. Jennifer Granholm created Michigan’s Office 
of  the Foundation Liaison (OFL), the first cabinet-
level office devoted to brokering partnerships 
between state government and the philanthropic 
Decisions were made in 
a month rather than in 
traditional grant cycles, 
requiring many foundations 
to innovate in their own 
grantmaking procedures, such 
as securing advance board 
approval.
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community. The office was the brainchild of  the 
state’s leading grantmakers; the president of  the 
Hudson-Webber Foundation, David Egner, had 
been inspired by an office in Detroit under Mayor 
Dennis Archer in the 1990s. The state’s founda-
tions supplied more than 90 percent of  the office’s 
funding, while the state provided office space and 
related resources. To head the office Granholm 
appointed Karen Aldridge-Eason, whose profes-
sional history embodied the office’s dual constitu-
ency: she directed the state’s Office of  Health and 
Human Services at the Department of  Manage-
ment and Budget and was budget director for the 
city of  Flint before working on the program staff 
at the C.S. Mott Foundation for nearly a decade.
According to its staff, OFL was designed to be 
“in” but not “of ” the state’s executive office. It is 
an uncomfortable but strategically indispensable 
position that allows Aldridge-Eason to maintain 
her independence and to balance her roles as rep-
resentative of  the foundation community and as 
nonpartisan foundation liaison. When Michigan 
grantmakers or government officials approach 
OFL with ideas for collaboration, the liaison 
provides feedback based on the perspective of  the 
prospective partner and then identifies potential 
contacts in the appropriate government agency 
or within the funding community. The office has 
brought foundations and government officials 
together to achieve significant reforms in K-16 
education, workforce development, health, early 
childhood, and land use. 
A key OFL achievement was promoting the Mich-
igan Benefit Access Initiative (MBAI), an effort 
to create a comprehensive, web-based benefits-
access system to help  capture the more than $920 
million in federal benefits earmarked to Michigan 
families that go unclaimed each year. The non-
profit community and government officials had 
been working on their own online registration 
and delivery systems for these benefits for several 
years; the Kellogg Foundation funded a yearlong 
evaluation, completed in 2003, of  the various 
efforts to establish these systems and pressed 
government officials for a speedier estimate of  
the proposed programs’ costs. But it was not until 
Aldridge-Eason addressed the state and nonprofit 
turf  battles that the sectors became better aligned 
to more effectively leverage their expertise and 
dollars. She helped coordinate funding from 
grantmakers that included the Ford, Kellogg, 
and Kresge foundations and the Open Society 
Institute, which supplied an out-of-state matching 
grant. She also organized a trip with foundation 
leaders and government officials to evaluate a 
web-based program used in Ohio; all parties came 
away in favor of  expanding the Michigan system. 
At this point the two tracks began to converge, 
with nonprofit, foundation, and government lead-
ers collaborating effectively ( Johnson Center for 
Philanthropy, 2013).
Perhaps the greatest challenge Aldridge-Eason 
faced was to convince both of  her constituencies 
that OFL was nonpartisan and that its main objec-
tive was not to help state officials extract more 
money from foundations for their pet projects 
(PolicyWorks, 2010). The liaison’s refusal to work 
on several potential collaborations during Gran-
holm’s re-election campaign helped bolster OFL’s 
reputation for nonpartisanship. The OFL advisory 
committee, whose members include contribut-
ing funders, the Council of  Michigan Founda-
tions, the Michigan Nonprofit Association, and 
a member of  the governor’s executive staff, also 
OFL was designed to be 
“in” but not “of” the state’s 
executive office. It is an 
uncomfortable but strategically 
indispensable position that 
allows Aldridge-Eason to 
maintain her independence 
and to balance her roles 
as representative of  the 
foundation community and as 
nonpartisan foundation liaison.
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did much to safeguard the office’s neutrality. The 
election of  Republican Gov. Rick Snyder in 2010 
brought about an important test for OFL, since 
many in the new governor’s office initially viewed 
it as a Granholm administration holdover. By fo-
cusing on policies central to Snyder’s agenda, such 
as early childhood education, Aldridge-Eason built 
support within his administration and ensured 
OFL’s survival for the immediate future. Public of-
ficials recognized OFL’s effectiveness as a match-
maker; according to a 2010 survey, 87 percent of  
government and foundation leaders believed that 
OFL had increased collaboration between founda-
tions and government in the state (Behrens, 2010; 
Ferris & Williams, 2013). As of  2013, the OFL had 
brokered more than $100 million in foundation 
investments in Michigan ( Johnson Center for Phi-
lanthropy, 2013). The fate of  OFL in the coming 
years will provide insights into the capability of  
such liaisons to insulate themselves from charges 
of  partisanship and operate across party lines.2
A number of  other states and cities, including 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Newark, 
N.J., and a regional group in the Pacific Northwest 
took interest in the Michigan model. A 2010 study 
identified 18 examples of  local or state govern-
2 See also the Mott Foundation website, posted January 26, 
2009, available at http://www.mott.org/news/news/2008/
kaldridge.aspx
ments employing a designated office or liaison to 
foster PPPs (Wolk & Ebinger, 2010). At the federal 
level, the departments of  Education and Housing 
and Urban Development have established their 
own interagency offices to facilitate collabora-
tion with foundations and nonprofits; the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency and the Agri-
culture Department have designated officials to 
oversee philanthropic partnerships. As Michigan’s 
experience can attest, the spread of  these models 
points both to the difficulties in developing effec-
tive partnerships – they do not occur naturally, but 
require active cultivation – and to the importance 
many in the public and private sectors attach to 
them. And despite the interest, there has been 
some criticism that installing a single gatekeeper 
between foundations and government agencies 
can actually hinder effective partnerships by limit-
ing a healthy give-and-take. “Filtering doesn’t do 
anyone any good,” said an executive of  a medium-
sized foundation quoted in a 2010 GrantCraft 
report. “It homogenizes the ask. It’s a crutch for 
philanthropy” (GrantCraft 2010, p. 25).
Foundation/Government Interactions in 
Financial-Crisis Response
In addition to the White House’s embrace of  
social entrepreneurship, the Great Recession 
brought PPPs into their new prominence. The 
climate of  urgency, budgetary constraints, and 
compensating programmatic creativity that 
resulted from the economic crisis drew the 
public sector and foundations closer together. 
The relationships, however, were not always 
amicable. Economic need often led cash-strapped 
governments to pursue the most strained form of  
what might be termed zero-sum partnerships as 
public officials greedily eyed what they imagined 
to be bulging foundation coffers (Hall, 2011). 
Public officials often quite explicitly claimed that 
philanthropic dollars should fill the gaps left by 
government retrenchment. In July 2009, when 
California’s legislature slashed the state’s health 
insurance program for children by $144 million, 
lawmakers suggested that the only way to prevent 
children from losing access to the program was 
for a private foundation to make up the balance. 
In Missouri the year before, Gov. Matt Blunt 
pressured the Missouri Foundation for Health 
As Michigan’s experience 
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to direct 80 percent of  its annual grantmaking 
budget to underfunded state programs that would 
be selected by the governor (Gose, 2008). Blunt 
justified this “partnership”  – a term which he 
explicitly invoked – by pointing to the potential of  
increased economies of  scale and arguing that the 
foundation’s significant tax benefits qualified its 
endowment as “taxpayer assets” (Benbow, 2008).
Even in flush economic times, foundation leaders 
have resented the propensity of  some government 
officials to view them merely as a source of  ready 
cash. But during the recession, the specter of  such 
imperiousness haunted many foundation leaders 
as they reconsidered their engagements with the 
public sector. As Lance Lindblom, president of  
the Nathan Cummings Foundation, said at a 2008 
conference sponsored by the Council on Founda-
tions, grantmakers had to realize that they “are fat 
cows in a resource-scarce environment” and to as-
sume that their freedom to operate independently 
would come under increased assault (GrantCraft, 
2010, 13).3
The recession could also result in less direct pres-
sure on foundations to work with shrinking state 
and local governments to address mounting social 
needs. At the request of  the city’s mayor, the San 
Francisco Foundation in May 2009 convened a 
group to discuss how to mitigate the recession’s 
impact on human service agencies and then 
created a grant fund to help charities weather 
the crisis and maximize available resources by 
restructuring. Foundation leaders faced a difficult 
calculus, balancing the immediacy of  the need 
with the potential that philanthropic support 
would simply encourage legislators to throw off 
certain programs to the private sector; partner-
ships formed out of  the exigencies of  the mo-
ment might permanently reshape public-private 
boundaries. 
Similar fears troubled the deliberations of  grant-
makers across the country as they sought to prop 
up programs hit by budget cuts. After a fiscal crisis 
led California to threaten to close a number of  
3 New York Times, July 20, 2009; The Challenges of  Giving, 
Chronicle of  Philanthropy(20)15, 6. Working With Government: 
Guidance for Grantmakers, 13.
public parks, the legislature passed a law in 2011 
making it easier for nonprofit groups to take over 
park operation; by December, foundations and 
private philanthropists had stepped in to cover the 
costs of  maintenance and operation in nine parks. 
“We are concerned that Sacramento will see the 
philanthropic community stepping forward as 
a substitute for public funding … and subtract 
it f rom the budget,” said a spokesman for the 
California State Parks Foundation, which actually 
sponsored the enabling legislation (Fimrite, 2011). 
The lawmaker who introduced the legislation 
suggested he had similar fears, but defended the 
partnership by pointing out that the alternative 
was for the parks to fall into disuse. Even more 
recently, when philanthropists Laura and John 
Arnold made a personal donation of  $10 million 
to Head Start to cover funds the program was 
slated to lose due to the 2013 federal government 
shutdown, they acknowledged that “private dol-
lars cannot in the long term replace government 
commitments” and structured the gift as a loan 
to be repaid when the shutdown ended (Gazley, 
2013).4
Some public officials might have termed these ar-
rangements “partnerships,” though they certainly 
4 See also San Francisco Chronicle, December 15, 2011.
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entailed little active collaboration between foun-
dation and government officials. But the recession 
encouraged governments at every jurisdiction to 
think more strategically about maximizing avail-
able resources and to reach out constructively to 
the private sector. Entrepreneurialism, innovation, 
and performance measurement became lodestars 
of  the public sector, the virtues of  a reign of  
austerity. At the state and local levels, the possibil-
ity of  gaining access to federal stimulus funding, 
which required both government and philanthro-
py to act quickly and to modify their traditional 
decision-making processes, drew the two sectors 
closer together. As Andrew Wolk and Colleen 
Gross Ebinger (2010) note, 
Faced with steep budget deficits and minimal ap-
petite for higher taxes, plus historically low approval 
ratings for government – all exacerbated by a lagging 
economy that has created greater need among citi-
zens – government leaders set out to do more with 
less (p. 135).  
Expanding partnership opportunities with non-
profits and foundations became an increasingly 
attractive option. 
Many of  these more constructive public-philan-
thropic partnerships involved tapping into the 
funds provided by the federal stimulus package, 
which channeled billions to states and localities. 
Foundations took a leading role in ensuring that 
the funds were allocated and spent effectively. 
Connecticut offers a striking example of  one such 
collaboration, in which foundations brought to 
bear both their financial resources and their deep 
knowledge of  the state’s nonprofit service provid-
ers. In 2010, the state faced a $600 million budget 
deficit, a projected 2011 deficit of  $3.4 billion, and 
an unemployment rate of  more than 9 percent. 
In the face of  these statistics, officials from the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation alerted statewide 
advocates to a provision of  the stimulus package 
that made additional aid available to states for use 
by nonprofits and municipalities  – the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families Emergency Con-
tingency Fund (TANF-ECF). A working group 
that included foundation leaders, a representative 
from the Connecticut Council for Philanthropy, 
other nonprofits, and state officials then developed 
a subsidized job program and explored ways to 
ensure the state would seek emergency TANF 
funding to assist Connecticut’s nonprofits and 
municipalities.
 The Hartford Foundation for Public Giving paid 
a consultant to analyze the subsidized jobs plan; 
the Casey Foundation provided a grant to hire a 
consultant to manage the outreach to nonprofits 
that might have qualifying programs that could 
qualify for TANF-ECF; the Connecticut Council 
for Philanthropy alerted its members, who identi-
fied grantees likely to have increased funding in 
qualifying programs. State officials shared the list 
of  approved nonprofits and municipalities with 
grantmakers so they could take advantage of  the 
potential 4:1 TANF program match. This collabo-
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ration among the state, the nonprofit sector, and 
the grantmaking community brought $29 million 
in new federal funding to Connecticut (Connecti-
cut Council for Philanthropy, 2012).
Chicago featured one of  the most comprehensive 
public-philanthropic partnerships. In April 2009, 
Mayor Richard Daley asked city-based foundations 
for help in making the best use of  federal stimu-
lus funds. The result was the Chicago Recovery 
Partnership, which addressed an array of  urban-
renewal issues and involved business executives, 
city officials and some 50 foundation leaders. 
The partnership helped the city secure $2.2 bil-
lion in federal grants, including $469 million in 
competitive funds, and although the partnership 
disbanded with the end of  stimulus funding, 
several foundations continued to fund projects 
with their own resources. A report analyzing the 
partnership’s achievements suggests the effective-
ness of  this PPP was heightened by a number of  
characteristics of  the recovery effort: the promise 
of  new funding opportunities, the need for col-
laboration across governmental agencies, and, 
most notably, strong leadership from the mayor’s 
office (Chicago Recovery Partnership, 2010). To 
what extent these collaborations will persist is an 
important question.  
Chicago Community Trust President Terry 
Mazany observed in 2010 that the stimulus funds, 
though desperately needed by the city, repre-
sented “the worst-case scenario of  bad grantmak-
ing”: A large amount of  money was dumped on 
organizations that were expected to immediately 
“ramp up and deliver” and with the stipulation 
that the funding stream would abruptly cease in 
two years (Mazany, 2010, p. 10). Based on their 
own grantmaking experience, the foundations 
in the Chicago Recovery Partnership were able 
to reach out to nonprofits, many of  which had 
recently reduced staff, and help them rapidly 
rebuild capacity. The foundations also analyzed 
the challenges these nonprofits would face when 
the stimulus funds were terminated. Foundation 
employees were crucial members of  a team that 
helped expose contracting and procurement inef-
ficiencies and speed city payments to the nonprof-
its; they also helped write grant proposals seeking 
additional stimulus funding for the city. Other 
foundations funded research of  the stimulus-
funded programs; the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, for example, provided 
a grant to the University of  Illinois at Chicago 
to evaluate the city’s neighborhood stabiliza-
tion program. As Mazany suggested, many of  
these interventions called less upon the financial 
resources of  Chicago’s foundations than they did 
on their familiarity with the community (Chicago 
Recovery Partnership, 2010).
Opportunities to access stimulus funds sparked 
similar partnerships across the nation. The Rock-
efeller Foundation cosponsored a “boot camp” 
at Harvard University to train teams of  state and 
local officials to use stimulus money for energy-
efficiency projects. The California HealthCare 
Foundation helped the state take advantage of  
stimulus funds to expand the use of  information 
technology in health care. The foundation hired a 
consulting firm to help the state’s Department of  
Health Care Services develop a plan for using the 
money, and it provided the 10 percent matching 
funds required from the state for the adminis-
trative costs of  a program that provides incen-
tive payments to health care professionals and 
hospitals that adopt electronic health records. The 
foundation also contributed $2 million in match-
ing funds so that the state could apply for federal 
money to establish a $10 million fund to provide 
loans to help health care providers purchase 
electronic-records technology that would qualify 
them for Medicaid or Medicare incentive pay-
ments (Perry, 2009).
Conclusion
Our review of  the recent PPP landscape sug-
gests both prospects and perils for the emerging 
relationships between philanthropic foundations 
and governments at the federal, state, and local 
levels.  In their traditional quest for social innova-
tion, foundations have much to gain by aligning 
their agendas with the scale and resources of  the 
government; this may be particularly true at the 
federal level for the larger national foundations. 
But close partnerships also create an environment 
for turf  wars; as the federal government attempts 
to enter the social innovation arena, the tradi-
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tional division of  labor gives way to a new, still 
undefined paradigm. A more careful articulation 
of  how foundations can retain their innovative 
edge and maintain the comparative advantages 
that they bring to the table seems advisable – if  for 
no other reason than because critics of  founda-
tion influence on national policy are always close 
at hand. This has been particularly evident in the 
concerns about democratic control and private ac-
countabilities in education policy (Ravitch, 2010; 
Barkan, 2011). But the debate has not yet identi-
fied where private interventions are acceptable or 
at what level of  wealth or influence a foundation’s 
independence becomes a problem, and it is not 
clear how challenges to such high-level partner-
ships will shape attitude toward PPPs more 
generally.
Less at the federal but more so on the state and 
local levels, foundations will find another signifi-
cant challenge that the growth of  PPPs presents, 
as our review clearly suggests. Foundations in this 
country have been able to concentrate on innova-
tion without having to fend off demands to help 
foot current bills for social programs, so questions 
of  whether they should complement or substitute 
for government provision of  public goods have 
rarely been asked (Toepler, 2006). The financial 
crisis of  2007, however, brought greater demands 
that foundations fill the gaps left by local, state, 
and even federal budget cuts. Long a hallmark of  
European-style government/foundation relation-
ships, PPPs require a clearer understanding, even 
a redefinition, of  private and public responsibili-
ties toward funding social programs.
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